Introduction
It has long been established (Rosenmüller 1971 , Wilson 1971 , Harsanyi 1973 ) that for normal form games with an arbitrary number of players, if the payoffs can be independently perturbed, there is generically a finite number of equilibria. For the case of extensive form games Kreps and Wilson (1982) show that the equilibrium distributions on terminal nodes are generically finite.
The equivalent result for outcome games has turned out to be difficult to elucidate. On the one hand, Govindan and McLennan (2001) were the first to provide an example of a game form for which the Nash equilibria of the games associated to an open set of utility profiles induce a continuum of probability distributions on outcomes. Their example made use of three players and six outcomes. Examples of game forms with the same feature have appeared since: in Kukushkin, Litan, and Marhuenda (2008) with two players and four outcomes and in Litan, Marhuenda, and Sudhölter (2015) with three players and three outcomes.
On the other hand, there are a number of results that point towards the paucity of such examples. Govindan and McLennan (2001) proved that for games with two outcomes and any number of players the number of equilibrium distributions on outcomes is generically finite. Similar results have been obtained for two player, three outcomes games (González-Pimienta 2010), sender-receiver cheap-talk games (Park 1997) , zero sum or common interest games (Govindan and McLennan 1998, Litan and Marhuenda 2012) and games with three players and two strategies each (Litan, Marhuenda, and Sudhölter 2015) .
Clarifying for what types of game forms the number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by the Nash equilibria of the associated game is generically finite remains an open problem. In the present work we address this question and provide a partial answer. We find sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form. These are specified in terms of the ranks of two matrices constructed from the original game form and can be checked automatically.
Outcome game forms with two players
We follow very closely the notation and set up adopted in Litan, Marhuenda, and Sudhölter (2015) and Litan and Marhuenda (2012) . Let S 1 = {1, 2, . . . , m} and S 2 = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the two players' sets of pure strategies. Let S = S 1 × S 2 and consider a finite set of outcomes Ω. We denote by ∆(Ω) (resp. ∆ + (Ω)) the set of (resp. strictly positive) probability measures on Ω. An outcome game form is a function φ : S → ∆(Ω). We write φ = (φ ω ) ω∈Ω and for each outcome ω ∈ Ω we regard φ ω as an m × n matrix, the entries of which are the probabilities that φ(i, j) (1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m) assigns to the outcome ω ∈ Ω.
Agents have a utility function on outcomes u ∈ R Ω , which extends to a von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function. For each u ∈ R Ω we assign the matrix
Given two profiles of utilities on outcomes u 1 , u 2 ∈ R Ω for the players, the matrices u 1 (φ) and u 2 (φ) define the two-person game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) . A pair of strategies (x, y) ∈ ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) of that game if xu 1 (φ)y u 1 (φ) i· y and xu 2 (φ)y xu 2 (φ) ·j for all i ∈ S 1 and j ∈ S 2 . Here, u(φ) i· (resp. u(φ) ·j ) denote the i-th row (resp. j-th column) of the matrix u(φ). Throughout the paper, xu(φ) (resp. u(φ)y) are regarded as elements of R n (resp. R m ) and the scalar product of z,z ∈ R k is written as z ·z or simply as zz. The pair (x, y) is a completely mixed NE (CMNE) if, in addition, x ∈ ∆ + (S 1 ) and y ∈ ∆ + (S 2 ).
The strategies x ∈ ∆(S 1 ) and y ∈ ∆(S 2 ) of the players induce a probability distribution on Ω that assigns the probability x φ ω y to the outcome ω ∈ Ω.
We identify R Ω with Euclidean space R |Ω| . With this identification the mapping u → u(φ) is linear from R |Ω| into the linear space of m × n matrices. We say that a subset of R Ω is generic if it contains an open and dense subset. For l ∈ N, let d l denote the vector (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R l .
The number of pure NEs of a finite game is finite. In the case of games with a mixed NE, by eliminating those strategies that are played with zero probability, we will focus on the CMNEs of the corresponding subgames. Given two utility profiles
mixed strategies is a NE of the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) , then it is a solution of the following systems of linear 2 equations.
for some α i ∈ R, the payoff of player i = 1, 2.
Definition 2.1. Given an outcome game form φ and a pair of utility profiles
the system of equations (1) and (2), for some
We say that vector z ∈ R Ω is a quasi(probability)-distribution on Ω for the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) if there exists a QE (x, y) of that game such that for each ω ∈ Ω, z(ω) = xφ ω y.
Thus, the set of CMNE is a subset of the set of all QE of a given game. For the rest of the paper we fix an outcome game form φ. Given an m × n matrix A and b ∈ R m , (A|b) denotes the m × (n + 1) matrix that arises from A by adding b as final column and A t denotes the transpose matrix of A. Let
We rely on the following fact shown by Mas-Colell (2010) .
There is an open and dense (and hence generic) subset G of R Ω such that the following conditions hold.
(a) For every u ∈ G, we have rank u(φ) = k. After reordering, if necessary, the strategies of the players we may write
where B = B(u) is a k × k matrix with |B| = 0.
Throughout the rest of this exposition, we fix a reordering of the strategies of the players such that (a) holds. Consider the following polynomial on |Ω| variables,
Whenever p(u) = 0 we define
We have the following.
Proposition 2.2. If k = m = n, then generically there is at most one QE and, hence, at most one
has no QE and, hence, no CMNE.
(b) If k 1 = k 2 = k and p is the zero polynomial, then for any u 1 , u 2 ∈ G the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) has no QE and, hence, no CMNE.
1 When there is no danger of confusion, we will not write explicitly the dependence on the utility u for matrices.
(c) Let
there is a continuum of
QEs of the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) . Furthermore, the systems of linear equations (1) and (2) have a solution only if the payoffs are α i = α u i , i = 1, 2, with α defined in (5).
Proof. The case k 1 = k 2 = k of the Proposition is a standard result in elementary Linear Algebra. See
Lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 in Litan and Marhuenda (2012) for the proof of parts (b) and (c).
We prove next part (a). We consider only the case k 1 = k + 1. The case k 2 = k + 1 is similar. We remark first that, since d m is not a linear combination of the columns of u(φ), any y ∈ R n which is a solution of (1) for some u ∈ G, must satisfy u(φ)y = 0.
Assume now that there are u 1 , u 2 ∈ G such that the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) has a QE (x, y) with x ∈ R m and y ∈ R n . Then, u 1 (φ)y = 0 by the previous remark. Since, G is open, there exists ε > 0 such that
is also a QE of the game ū(φ), u 2 (φ) andū(φ) y = εd m . But, this contradicts the remark in the previous paragraph. Hence, part (a) of the Proposition follows.
Since, k 1 , k 2 ∈ {k, k + 1} and we are only interested in the existence of a continuum of CMNEs, from now we consider only games for wich the following holds.
Assumption 2.3.
• k 1 = k 2 = k < max{m, n}.
• The polynomial p in (4) is not the zero polynomial.
Note that, under the above assumption, the set U = {u ∈ G : p(u) = 0} is open and dense in R |Ω| .
Hence, it is generic. Let α : U → R as in (5). Define the functions
The following is proved in Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 of Litan and Marhuenda (2012).
Lemma 2.4. Let Assumption 2.3 hold and let u ∈ U . Then,
For V ⊂ R l a linear subspace and a ∈ R l we let aV = V a = {a · v : v ∈ V }. From now on, we follow the notation of Lemma 2.4. Given u ∈ U we define K 1 (u) = {z ∈ R n : u(φ)z = 0} and K 2 (u) = {t ∈ R m :
tu(φ) = 0}. Since, we are assuming that
and K 2 (u) = ker u(φ) t = ker (u(φ) t |d n ). We see from Lemma 2.4 that
Any QE (x, y) of the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) may be written as
for some v ∈ R n−k and w ∈ R m−k . When there is no danger of confusion we will not write explicitly the dependence on u 1 , u 2 , v or w. For each outcome ω ∈ Ω, define the following polynomial in the variables
The probability that outcome ω ∈ Ω occurs is q ω (v, w). Given x ∈ R m , y ∈ R n we define the following subspaces.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose that Assumption 2.3 holds. Let ω ∈ Ω, u 1 , u 2 ∈ U . If either of the following two conditions hold (a) x u 2 φ ω K 1 u 1 = {0} for every solution x u 2 of the system of equations (2).
(b) K 2 (u 2 ) φ ω y u 1 = {0} for every solution y u 1 of the system of equations (1).
Proof. Suppose that condition (a) holds. Let t ∈ K 2 (u 2 ). Recall that we may write t as t = x 1 −x 2 , where x 1 , x 2 are two solutions of the system of equations (2). Let z ∈ K 1 (u 1 ). Then,
Proposition 2.6. Suppose that Assumption 2.3 holds. Let u 1 , u 2 ∈ U . The set of QE of the game defined by u 1 (φ) and u 2 (φ) induce finitely many quasi-distributions on Ω if and only if the following two conditions hold.
(a) x u 2 φ ω K 1 u 1 = {0} for every ω ∈ Ω and every solution x u 2 of the system of equations (2).
(b) K 2 (u 2 )φ ω y u 1 = {0} for every ω ∈ Ω and for every solution y u 1 of the system of equations (1).
Proof. Since, the set of QE's of the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) is convex we have that the set {z ∈ R Ω : z is a quasi-distribution on Ω for the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) } is connected. Hence, the QEs induce finitely many quasi-distributions on outcomes if and only if they induce a unique quasi-distribution on outcomes. We prove next part (a). Assume there is a unique quasi-distribution induced on outcomes by the QEs of the game. Let x = x u 2 be a solution of (2), and
We write z = y 1 − y 2 , where y 1 , y 2 are two solutions of (1). Then, for each ω ∈ Ω, we have that x φ ω y 1 = x φ ω y 2 . So,
Thus, x φ ω K 1 u 1 = {0} and (a) follows. Similarly, we can prove (b).
Conversely, suppose that conditions (a) and (b) hold. Let u 1 , u 2 ∈ U and ω ∈ Ω. By Lemma 2.5 we have
we have that
And the QEs of the game defined by u 1 (φ) and u 2 (φ) induce a unique quasi-distribution on Ω.
Corollary 2.7. Let Assumption 2.3 hold. Suppose there are two sets of vectors V 1 ⊂ R n and V 2 ⊂ R m such that for every u ∈ U and i = 1, 2 we have that V i generates K i (u). Then, for any u 1 , u 2 ∈ U the set of CMNE of the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) induce finitely many probability distributions on outcomes.
Proof. Let z ∈ V 1 and t ∈ V 2 . For every u ∈ U , we have that tu(φ) = u(φ)z = 0. Since, the entries of u(φ) are linear in u and U contains an open subset of R |Ω| , we see that tφ ω = φ ω z = 0 for every
for every u ∈ U and ω ∈ Ω. The result follows now from Proposition 2.6.
The following result provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of finitely many probability distributions on outcomes in games induced by outcome game forms.
Theorem 2.8. Let Assumption 2.3 hold, u 1 , u 2 ∈ U and suppose there is, at least, one CMNE of the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) . Then, the set of all the CMNE of that game induces finitely many probability distributions on outcomes iff for every
The proof is based on techniques developed in Litan and Marhuenda (2012) . A review of these and the details of the proof are provided in the appendix.
induce finitely many quasi-distributions on outcomes if and only if for every ω ∈ Ω and every QE x u 2 , y u 1 of that game the following two conditions hold.
Proof. Let u 1 , u 2 ∈ U . By Proposition 2.6, the set of QE of the game u 1 (φ), u 2 (φ) induce finitely many quasi-distributions on outcomes if and only if for every ω ∈ Ω, every solution x u 2 of the system of equations (2) and every solution y u 1 of the system of equations (1) we have that x u 2 φ ω K 1 u 1 = {0}
and K 2 (u 2 )φ ω y u 1 = {0}. This is equivalent to the statement that x u 2 φ ω is orthogonal to K 1 u 1 and φ ω y u 1 is orthogonal to K 2 (u 2 ), which occurs if and only if x u 2 φ ω is in the image of u 1 (φ) t and φ ω y u 1 is in the image of u 2 (φ).
Lemma A.2. Let ω ∈ Ω and u 1 , u 2 ∈ U . Let Assumption 2.3 hold and suppose that
Proof. We use the notation
to denote the decomposition of the matrix u(φ) in (3) applied to the matrix φ ω . Let
We can write now
By elementary row and column operations,
Finally,
It follows from Lemma 2.4 that
Therefore, E Conversely, suppose now that rank F = 2k. We proceed now as in Lemma A.2 and write F as
The above argument shows that rank F = rank
